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THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF TITLE VII*
by
Michael B. Metzger** and John F Suhre***
A N unheralded struggle is underway concerning the jurisdictional reachf title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Both private plaintiffs and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) are attempting
to extend the protection afforded by the title VII proscription of employ-
ment discrimination 2 to situations other than those arising out of the tradi-
tional employer-employee context. 3 A recent EEOC decision,4 for
example, bases the Commission's jurisdiction upon whether a "deprivation
of a protected right" has occurred rather than upon the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between a respondent and a charging
party.5
Attempts to expand title VII jurisdiction have met with mixed success in
the courts. While some courts clearly have extended the reach of title VII
beyond traditional employer-employee situations, 6 others have been un-
* The views expressed in this Article are the authors' alone. In no way do they
represent an official statement of policy by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
** A.B., J.D., Indiana University. Associate Professor of Business Law, Graduate
School of Business, Indiana University.
*** A.B., J.D., Indiana University. Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
2. Title VII makes it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Id § 2000e-2(a)(l).
3. The traditional common law test for distinguishing between employees and in-
dependent contractors is the "right of control" retained by the person for whom the work is
being done, "not only as to the result accomplished by the work, but also as to the details
and means by which that result is accomplished." NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167
F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948). Other factors used to determine
whether an employer-employee relationship exists include: whether the person rendering
service has a substantial investment in his tools or equipment; whether such person under-
takes a substantial cost by performing the service or has an opportunity to profit depending
upon his management or skill; whether such person works in the course of the recipient's
business rather than in some ancillary capacity; and whether the parties have a permanent
relationship. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. United States, 503 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1974).
In addition to application to employees in the traditional sense, title VII has been applied
to pensioners (Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971)), discharged employ-
ees (Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969)), and appli-
cants for employment (Wilson v. Monsanto Co., 315 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. La. 1970)).
4. EEOC Decision No. 79-09 (Oct. 20, 1978), discussed at text accompanying notes
130-41 infra.
5. For a concise exposition of title VII procedures, see Note, The Prolferation of Em-
ployment Discrimination Statutory Protections." An Overview, 8 Loy. CHi. L.J. 934, 937-39
(1977).
6. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973), discussed at
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willing to do so.7 Title VII attacks aimed at allegedly discriminatory ac-
tion by state licensing agencies have encountered especially strong judicial
resistance.8 This opposition has been strongest against attempts to apply
title VII to professional licensing cases. 9
The ultimate resolution of the jurisdictional scope of title VII is of obvi-
ous importance. A broad interpretation of title VII jurisdiction could ex-
tend the title's protections to areas of economic activity that heretofore
have been practically immune to the title's scrutiny. In addition to afford-
ing protection in the licensing area previously mentioned, the adoption of
a broader jurisdictional test could give protection to, among others, in-
dependent contractors,' 0 franchisees," franchisees' employees, 12 and em-
ployees seeking to pursue title VII claims against persons other than their
immediate employers. 13
This Article examines the arguments for and against a broad interpreta-
tion of title VII jurisdiction, delineates the nature of the jurisdictional test
currently adopted by the EEOC, and illustrates the application of that test
in various factual contexts.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS TOWARD A JURISDICTIONAL TEST
In a manner reminiscent of the fabled blind men attempting to divine
the physical attributes of an elephant by touching isolated parts of its anat-
omy, courts on both sides of the jurisdictional issue have focused primarily
on the language of title VII as a justification for their disparate holdings.
That this approach should be used is not surprising. Resort to legislative
history, the traditional recourse for a court facing a statute susceptible to
text accompanying notes 38 & 47 infra; Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375
F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974), discussed at note 56 and text accompanying note 76 infra.
7. See Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), a f'd, 580 F.2d
1054 (9th Cir. 1978), discussed at text accompanying notes 21-34 infra; Mathis v. Standard
Brands Chem. Indus., Inc., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,306 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 1975),
discussed at notes 58-59 infra.
8. See NOW v. Waterfront Comm'n, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9253 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 1979), discussed at text accompanying notes 123-29 infra; Lavender-Cabellero v.
Department of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 112-22 infra. But see Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375
F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974).
The 1972 amendments to title VII extended coverage to all state and local governments.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1970)).
9. All such attempts to date have failed. See text accompanying notes 90-Il1 infra for
discussion of professional licensing cases.
10. See cases cited in note 7 supra; Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338
(D.C. Cir. 1973), discussed at text accompanying notes 38 & 47 infra.
I1. Consider, for example, the case of a franchised dealer who alleges that his franchise
was terminated on grounds proscribed by title VII.
12. This situation might arise when a former employee of a franchisee alleges that the
franchisor caused his discharge for proscribed reasons.
13. See EEOC Decision No. 79-09 (Oct. 20, 1978), discussed at text accompanying notes
130-41 infra, wherein 12 female employees brought a title VII claim against the insurer
providing an optional employee retirement program through their employer, based on the




varying interpretations, is a difficult 14 and questionable'- exercise in all
but the most clear-cut situations. The legislative history of title VII 16 sheds
little light on the issue at hand. 17 Thus, courts construing title VII fre-
quently feel compelled to adhere to a narrow, highly literal interpretation
of the statute.18
Courts that have narrowly construed the jurisdictional reach of title VII
have focused on the use of the terms "employer" and "employee" in sec-
tions 701 and 703 of the Act 19 and have interpreted those terms in accord-
ance with their common law meaning.20 The most detailed exposition of
this view is found in Smith v. Durra Trucking Co.2' The plaintiff in Smith
was a woman who operated an independent trucking business with her
husband. The Smiths had entered several subhauling agreements with
Dutra Trucking Company, an overlying carrier. 22 After the plaintiff had
14. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 29 (1974): "[l]t is not easy
to find the intent of the legislature." The author subsequently observes: "The difficulty is
that what the legislature intended is ambiguous." Id at 30.
15. For a general discussion of the identification between legal positivism and the idea
of legislative intent, see Lehman, How to Interpret a Dicult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489,
496-501. Professor Lehman notes: "It might well be that no solution [to a given problem of
statutory interpretation] would attract a clear majority. Indeed, that may be the reason for
the silence and ambiguity in the first place." Id at 500. The author further observes that
"the intent of the legislature is a phantom because the will of the legislature is a metaphor."
Id
16. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137-86 (1972); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2355-519 (1964). For a detailed discussion of the circumstances surrounding the pas-
sage of title VII, see Vaas, Title VI" Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431
(1966). For a view of the historical context of title VII, see Jones, The Development of Mod-
ern Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action Law:- A Brief Chronological Over-
view, 20 How. L.J. 74 (1977).
17. "No party has set forth, nor has this court been able to find, any explicit language,
in either the statute or the legislative history, to illuminate this issue." Lavender-Cabellero
v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
18. The Supreme Court stated: "There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the
purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to
its wishes." United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
19. Section 701(b) defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Section 701(0 states that "'employee' means an
individual employed by an employer .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976). Section 703(a)
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l) & (2) (1976).
20. See note 3 supra.
21. 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aIJ'd, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978).
22. The court explained:
To supply its customers with transportation service, Dutra makes use of both
its own employees and independent owner-operators like plaintiff. The in-
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hauled one load of asphalt pursuant to a subhauling contract with Dutra,
her husband was told by Dutra's president that she would not be allowed
to drive on any jobs for Dutra. Subsequently, Dutra withdrew an offer for
another subhauling contract after being informed that the female plaintiff
would be driving. Smith then filed a title VII suit 23 against Dutra, who
moved for a summary judgment on the ground that no employment rela-
tionship had ever existed between plaintiff and defendant. 24 The court ac-
knowledged that since Dutra was an "employer" within the meaning of the
Act,25 the resolution of the issue depended upon whether the plaintiff was
considered Dutra's employee or an independent contractor.26 While ad-
mitting that the Act's circuitous definition of "employee" 27 provided little
assistance in resolving the issue thus cast 28 and that there was precedent
supporting the proposition that the terms "employee" and "independent
contractor" are "not to be construed in their common-law sense when used
in federal social welfare legislation, ' 29 the court concluded that including
the plaintiff within the definition of "employee" would be an unwarranted
broadening of title VII. 30
The Dutra court based its conclusion upon prior judicial experience with
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),3' noting that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,32 giving a
broad construction to the term "employee" as used in the NLRA, pro-
duced an adverse congressional response in the form of an amendment
specifically excluding independent contractors from coverage.33 The court
dependent owner-operator works under a subhauling agreement with Dutra
which recites that the subhauler is an independent contractor. Dutra collects a
broker's fee of 5% as the overlying carrier.
410 F. Supp. at 515.
23. Counsel for Smith argued that she was either a Dutra "employee" within the mean-
ing of the Act, or that she was protected by title VII because Dutra controlled her access to
employment. Id.
24. Id at 514.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976), quoted in note 19 supra.
26. 410 F. Supp. at 515. By casting the issue in these terms, the court made an apriori
assumption that independent contractors are not covered by title VII, thereby lending an air
of inevitability to its ultimate conclusion.
27. See note 19 supra.
28. 410 F. Supp. at 515.
29. Id at 516. The court cited Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299
(5th Cir. 1975), which in turn cited Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); and
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The court noted that the Bartels Court
had defined "employees" as "those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon
the business to which they render service." Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947),
cited in 410 F. Supp. at 516.
30. 410 F. Supp. at 516. The court even acknowledged that "conceivably it could be
argued that plaintiff would be considered an 'employee'" under the Bartels test. Id
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
32. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
33. 410 F. Supp. at 516. Assuming, arguendo, that the judicial experience with the
NLRA is relevant to questions of title VII interpretation, one might argue with equal justifi-
cation that Congress knew the history of the NLRA and could have avoided statutory lan-
guage with connotations broader than the traditional common law employer-employee
relationship (see discussion at text accompanying notes 35-56 infra), or included specific
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agreed with Smith that title VII should not be construed too narrowly, but
concluded that nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicated a con-
gressional intent to construe the term "employee" other than in accordance
with common law agency principles.34
In contrast, the leading cases supporting an expanded interpretation of
title VII have discovered in the language of the title a congressional intent
to reach beyond traditional employer-employee relationships to protect
employment opportunities. 35 Title VII expressly includes within its reach
employment agencies 36 and labor organizations 37 as well as employers.
Thus the court in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson,38 considering a di-
language excluding independent contractors and others similarly situated if it intended a
similar result.
34. 410 F. Supp. at 516. Of course, as noted at notes 16-17 and accompanying text
supra, the legislative history of title VII is equally devoid of any evidence indicating a spe-
cific congressional intent to follow the traditional common law definitions of "employer"
and "employee."
35. Sibley Memorial Hosp. v.Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hackett v. Mc-
Guire Bros., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375
F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l) & (2) (1976), quoted in
note 19 supra.
36. Section 701(c) provides: "The term 'employment agency' means any person regu-
larly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to
procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such
a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (1976).
Section 703(b) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to
fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against,
any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to
classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id § 2000e-2(b).
37. Section 701(d) provides:
The term "labor organization" means a labor organization engaged in an
industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an organization, and in-
cludes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation
committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees partici-
pate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or
other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general com-
mittee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate
to a national or international labor organization.
Id. § 2000e(d).
Section 703(c) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or applicants for mem-
bership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
Id. § 2000e-2(c).
38. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The plaintiff in Sibley alleged that the defendant
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rect employment relationship between a male private duty nurse claiming
sex discrimination and the defendant hospital, observed:
We think it significant that the Act has addressed itself directly to the
problems of interference with the direct employment relationship by
labor unions and employment agencies-institutions which have not a
remote but a highly visible nexus with the creation and continuance of
direct employment relationships between third parties. 39
Employment agencies, unlike employers hiring independent contractors,
generally control only an applicant's access to employment opportunities
and have no control over the terms and conditions of employment or the
criteria for employability. The fact that Congress expressly extended the
Act's coverage to these agencies that exert less control and to labor unions
that exert more control over employment opportunities than an employer
hiring an independent contractor may support the inclusion of independ-
ent contractors within the Act's loose "employee" definition. While this
argument may be countered by citing the familiar maxim of statutory con-
struction, expresslo unius, est exciusio alterius,4° the maxim itself is increas-
ingly falling into disrepute. 4'
An argument can be made that the term "employer" as used in sections
701(b) and 703(a) of the Act 42 was merely intended to designate one class
subject to the Act rather than to establish a relationship to which the Act's
proscriptions apply.43 This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that sub-
hospital had discriminated against him based on his sex by refusing to refer him to female
patients who had requested a private nurse. Patients at Sibley Hospital could request a
private duty nurse through the hospital, and the hospital referred requests to a central regis-
try of private nurses. The court determined that the facts as alleged indicated the defendant
hospital had blocked the plaintiffs access to patients. Id at 1342.
39. Id at 1342. See also Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 445 (3d Cir. 1971);
Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (D.N.H. 1974)
("Throughout the Act and the applicable federal regulations, an intent to deal with more
than the conventional employer-employee situation is indicated. This intent is demon-
strated by the specific prohibition against discrimination by employment agencies and labor
organizations .... ").
40. Enumeration of specific items implies the exclusion of all others. United States v.
Robinson, 359 F. Supp. 52, 58-59 (S.D. Fla. 1973). The expressio unius idea may explain the
following language in Lavender-Cabellero v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp.
213, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1978): "Congress chose not to enact provisions which would have ex-
tended Title VII in the fashion requested by the plaintiff."
41. One author observed:
The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another is in
direct contradiction to the habits of speech of most persons. To say that all
men are mortal does not mean that all women are not, or that all other ani-
mals are not. There is no such implication, either in usage or in logic, unless
there is a very particular emphasis on the word men. It is neither customary
nor convenient to indicate such emphasis in statutes, and without this indica-
tion, the first comment on the rule is that it is not true.
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873-74 (1930), reprinted in M. COHEN
& E. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 511 (1951). See also
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 951 (1973).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b) & -2(a)(l) & (2) (1976), quotedin note 19 supra.
43. As originally worded, § 701(b) applied to employers who had 25 or more employ-
ees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970) (amended 1972). The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, amended this section by reducing the number
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sequent sections of the Act do not restrict the Act's prohibitions to discrim-
inatory acts against "employees" as defined by section 701(f),44 nor do they
place such a limitation on those having standing to sue for a violation of
the Act. For example, section 703(a)(1) of the Act,45 in contrast to the
more specialized section 703(a)(2), 46 does not limit its prohibitions to dis-
crimination against "employees" or "applicants for employment." In-
stead, it prohibits discrimination on the basis of the enumerated criteria
against "any individual," a factor that has led to judicial conclusions that
Congress intended the Act's proscriptions to extend beyond the traditional
employer-employee relationship. As the court in Sibley observed:
The Act defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an em-
ployer," but nowhere are there words of limitation that restrict refer-
ences in the Act to "any individual" as comprehending only an
employee of an employer. Nor is there any good reason to confine the
meaning of "any individual" to include only former employees and
applicants for employment, in addition to present employees. These
words should, therefore, be given their ordinary meaning so long as
that meaning does not conflict with the manifest policy of the Act.47
Section 706(b) of the Act also militates in favor of a broad interpretation
of title VII jurisdiction by granting standing to "person[s] claiming to be
aggrieved" by violations of the Act rather than limiting standing to pro-
spective, current, or former employees.48 One court determined that, in
using the "aggrieved person" language to confer standing, Congress
demonstrated an intention to define standing as broadly as article III of the
Constitution permits. 49 To establish standing, a plaintiff must meet a two-
of employees required to 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). This fact lends some credence to
the view that a primary concern of this section is to exempt from the Act's scrutiny entities
below a certain size.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976), quoted in note 19 supra.
45. Id § 2000e-2(a)(l).
46. Id § 2000e-2(a)(2).
47. Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court
further observed:
Control over access to the job market may reside, depending upon the circum-
stances of the case, in a labor organization, an employment agency, or an em-
ployer as defined in Title VII; and it would appear that Congress has
determined to prohibit each of these from exerting any power it may have to
foreclose, on invidious grounds, access by any individual to employment op-
portunities otherwise available to him.
Id See also Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1091
(D.N.H. 1974), discussed at note 56 infra, wherein the court concluded:
Throughout the Act and the applicable federal regulations, an intent to deal
with more than the conventional employer-employee situation is indicated.
This intent is demonstrated by the specific prohibition against discrimination
by employment agencies and labor organizations, and by the prohibition of
discrimination against individuals (as opposed to employees who are defined
as "individual[s] employed by an employer.")
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). As the Sibley court observed: "It seems unlikely that
Congress would confer standing to bring a suit under the Act upon persons without rights
under the Act because they are not employees." 488 F.2d at 1341.
49. Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971). The court of appeals in
Hackett reversed a district court dismissal of a pensioner's title VII claim. The district court
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pronged test: constitutional and statutory.50 A plaintiff must demonstrate
an "injury in fact" and an interest "arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute." 5 1 The use of this test for stand-
ing has led some courts to conclude that Congress must have intended that
title VII reach beyond conventional employer-employee relationships.5 2
Further support for a broad reading of title VII has been found in the
perceived public policy behind the title,53 the general principle that reme-
dial legislation is to be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes,5 4 and
had held that he was not an "employee" within the meaning of title VII. The court of
appeals observed:
In reaching the conclusion that Hackett, as a pensioner, lacked standing the
district court relied upon the defintion of "employee" in Section 701(f) of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(, as "an individual employed by an employer." But
that definition, in a general section of the Title devoted to definitions, does not
speak to the issue of standing to invoke the remedies of the Act. The remedies
section is § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. That section permits "a person claiming
to be aggrieved" to file a charge with the Commission .... A person claim-
ing to be aggrieved may never have been an employee of the defendant ...
An aggrieved person obviously is any person aggrieved by any of the forbid-
den practices.
Id. at 445.
50. See Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
51. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
52. Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court
in Sibley observed:
The Act, in providing for the filing of complaints with EEOC and of even-
tual actions in the District Court, does not use the term "employee." The
phrase is, rather, the "person aggrieved;" and that term can certainly be taken
as comprehending individuals who do not stand in a direct employment rela-
tionship with an employer. The fact that the Act purports to provide remedies
for a class broader than direct employees is a strong indication that the pro-
scriptions contemplated by Section 703(a)(1) reach beyond the immediate em-
ployment relationship.
Id Contra, Mathis v. Standard Brands Chem. Indus., Inc., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
10,306 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 1975), discussed at note 58 infra.
53. One court emphasized: "More specifically, the Act is aimed at providing equal em-
ployment opportunities. Its purpose is to 'achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past' in a discriminatory fashion." Puntolillo v.
New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (D.N.H. 1974) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson,
488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442
F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)), in which the court stated: "In
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, 'one of Congress' main goals
was to provide equal access to the job market for both men and women.' " For a general
statement on this point, see Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title
VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971). "Underlying Title VII is
the public interest in eliminating employment discrimination in order to guarantee to minor-
ities the economic status necessary to a free society and to insure maximum utilization of
human potential." Id at 1196.
54. Both the the Third Circuit and district court in New Hampshire support a broad
construction. "The national public policy reflected both in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and in § 1981 may not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial
doctrines of standing. ... Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971).
"The courts have consistently recognized that 'Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
should not be construed narrowly.'" Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F.
Supp. 1089, 1092 (D.N.H. 1974) (citations omitted).
See generally Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516-17 (10th Cir. 1947), a
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the deference ordinarily afforded to administrative interpretations of a
statute. 5" The case of Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Commission,56
for example, in which the plaintiff, a driver-trainer of horses, alleged dis-
criminatory treatment based on his national origin, reinforces all three of
these rationales. In light of the fact that neither Sibley nor Puntolillo, the
leading cases arguing for an expanded view of title VII jurisdiction, has
been expressly overruled, the issue at hand is perhaps more accurately
viewed as how far title VII jurisdiction should extend beyond conventional
employer-employee relationships rather than whether such an extension
should be made.
A. Independent Contractors
The leading cases denying a title VII remedy to independent contrac-
tors, Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co.5 7 and Mathis v. Standard Brands Chemi-
cal Industries, Inc.,58 sought to distinguish Sibley and Puntolillo, and
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case holding "boners" at a slaughterhouse were "employ-
ees" within the meaning of the FLSA, even though their contract provided that they were
independent contractors. The traditional common law distinction between employees and
independent contractors, the court observed,
is not necessarily decisive in a case of this kind, as the Act concerns itself with
the correction of economic evils through remedies which were unknown at
common law, and if it expressly or by fair implication brings within its ambit
workers in the status of these boners, it is immaterial whether under the prin-
ciples of the common law the relationship between Kaiser and the boners has
been that of employer and independent contractor for other purposes.
Id at 516. See also text accompanying note 29 supra; United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704
(1947).
55. See Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H.
1974). "It should also be noted that, since the Equal Employment Opportunities [sic] Com-
mission Determination reached the merits of plaintiffs complaint, the District Office must
have thought that the relationship between plaintiff and defendants showed sufficient indicia
of employment to bring plaintiff's claim within the Commission's jurisdiction." Id at 1092.
See also Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271, 1276 (D. Or. 1975); Woodford v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911, 914 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Williams v. New Orleans Steamship
Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613, 615 (E.D. La. 1972).
56. 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974). Puntolillo filed a title VII suit against the New
Hampshire Racing Commission (NHRC) and the New Hampshire Trotting and Breeding
Association (TBA). Puntolillo argued that the NHRC and the TBA had discriminated
against him on the basis of his national origin by denying him the license and stall space
necessary for him to gain employment with harness horse owners. The defendants moved to
dismiss his complaint on the grounds that there was no employment relationship between
plaintiff and themselves. The court, in an opinion strongly influenced by Sibley, ruled in
favor of Puntolillo, noting that although the NHRC and the TBA were not his employers,
they had "control over the ability of a driver-trainer to race, i. e., earning a living,. . . that is
coequal with that of the racehorse owners." Id at 1090. The court concluded by saying:
Defendants here are certainly employers within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b); and they certainly "control... access to [plaintiffs] job market."
Plaintiff has alleged discriminatory actions which fall within the purview of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and I cannot say that these alleged actions fall completely
without the scope of activities sought to be prohibited by Title VII.
Id at 1092 (citing Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1341, 1342).
57. 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), af]'d, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978).
58. 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,306 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 1975). Mathis was a black
worker who had performed industrial waste removal services for the defendant from April
1970 to February 1972, when the defendant awarded the contract for waste removal to an-
other contractor. Mathis brought suit under title VII, alleging that he was denied the con-
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thereby to limit their impact upon title VII's jurisdictional reach. Two
main distinctions were drawn. First, both the Smith and Mathis courts
emphasized that Sibley and Puntolillo dealt with interference with "em-
ployment" relationships and "employment" opportunities. 59 "Employ-
ment" was then defined in the traditional common law sense of the term,
leading to the inevitable conclusion that independent contractors are not
entitled to title VII protection because they are not "employees" in the
traditional sense.60 This treatment of Sibley and Puntolillo ignores the
spirit of both cases,6 ' the authority calling for a broad construction of re-
medial legislation, 62 and the fact that the plaintiffs in both cases could
have been considered independent contractors. 63
The Smith court also distinguished Sibley and Puntolillo on the ground
tract because of his race. The defendant moved for a summary judgment on the basis that
Mathis was an independent contractor and not an employee. The EEOC submitted an ami-
cus curiae brief arguing that title VII was applicable regardless of whether Mathis was an
independent contractor or an employee because he was "a person claiming to be aggrieved"
by a practice prohibited by the Act. The court rejected this argument, stating: "The law,
then, is aimed at correcting discrimination in employment. Consequently, there must be
some relationship with an employment situation." Id at 5246. The court refused to grant
the requested summary judgment, however, noting that an examination of the "economic
realities" of the relationship between the parties was required to determine whether Mathis
was an independent contractor or an employee. Id. at 5246-47.
59. The language of both decisions focuses on the existence of such a relationship or
opportunity in Sibley and Puntolillo. "[B]oth Sibley and Puntolillo concern interference
with the creation of direct employment relationships." Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F.
Supp. at 518 (emphasis in original). The court in Mathis distinguished Sibley because "in
that case there was an employment relationship between the patient and the nurse," and
Puntolillo because "the court did not state that the plaintiff could sue where he had no
connection with an employment scheme. . . . [DIriver-trainers are employed by harness
horse owners." 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,306, at 5247 n.2.
60. "There are no facts before the Court to indicate that plaintiff was an employee, or
sought to become an employee, of Mercer-Fraser Company, the third-party employer to
whom Dutra allegedly blocked access." Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. at 518.
"Employment must be distinguished from the independent contractual associations of busi-
ness entities for the latter are not covered by Title VII." Mathis v. Standard Chem. Indus.,
Inc., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,306, at 5246.
61. The Sibley court concluded:
To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly affording it
the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an individual's employment
opportunities with another employer, while it could not do so with respect to
employment in its own service, would be to condone continued use of the very
criteria for employment that Congress has prohibited.
A fair reading of the Act in the light of its stated purposes precludes such a
result.
488 F.2d at 1341, quoted in Puntolillo, 375 F. Supp. at 1092.
62. See notes 29-32, 54 supra and accompanying text.
63. The Smith court recognized this factor, but chose to dispose of it in a conclusory
fashion:
Curiously, in neither Sibley nor Puntolilo did the courts specifically find that
access to employment relationships was denied. Arguably, a male nurse who
works on a day-to-day basis or a driver-trainer who works for a horse owner is
an independent contractor. Nevertheless the language of the opinions is con-
fined to interference with employment opportunities. Moreover, it is clear that
the opinions cannot be read as applying to the independent contractor context;
otherwise Title VII would authorize a cause for discriminatorily blocking ac-
cess to a type of relationship which is itself not covered by the Act.
410 F. Supp. at 518 n. I I (emphasis in original).
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that the defendants in both of the latter cases exercised a greater "degree of
control" over the plaintiffs' job market than Dutra Trucking had exercised
in the case of Smith.64 Thus the court concluded:
Here, however, plaintiff is not subject to defendant's authority. Plain-
tiff is not obligated to seek contracts through Dutra, nor can Dutra
deny plaintiff access to any potential employer. It is true that because
Dutra does not contract with plaintiff, she has fewer work opportuni-
ties, but Dutra's decision not to use plaintiff is not tantamount to
blocking her access to employment. 65
This distinction overlooks the fact that the plaintiff in Sibley, like Smith,
was not barred from all "work opportunities," because the hospital, while
denying the male nurse any assignment to female patients, regularly re-
ferred him to male patients. The likelihood that the plaintiff in Sibley
could have sought additional work through another hospital did not dis-
pose of the case in favor of the defendant. Finally, if one accepts the Bar-
tels v. Birmingham66 "economic realities" test as the determinant for
"employment" in remedial legislation,67 the "degree of control" distinction
loses its force in cases where a significant portion of the plaintiff's income
is derived from the kind of "work opportunities" allegedly being fore-
closed to the plaintiff on a discriminatory basis.
Additional arguments support the extension of title VII protection to
independent contractors. Viewing the issue from a social perspective, no
apparent reason exists to excuse discrimination against independent con-
tractors on the basis of proscribed criteria. The fact that a person ad-
versely affecting an individual's employment opportunities is not that
individual's employer according to the law of torts or contracts, or for the
purposes of workmen's compensation or the social security laws, should
not be dispositive. The adverse impact upon an unprotected individual's
economic opportunities remains the same. Furthermore, the economic op-
portunities of minorities and females should not be limited to traditional
employer-employee relationships. A narrow construction of title VII can
only hinder the full economic integration of disadvantaged groups into the
mainstream of American economic life68 and inhibit the "maximum utili-
64. Id at 518. The court noted that in Sibley the defendant hospital controlled the
premises upon which services were rendered, including access to the patient for the purpose
of securing employment. fd In Puntolillo, the court observed, the defendant "had virtually
complete control over plaintiff's access to employment [as a driver-trainer] through its li-
censing power." Id
65. Id But see EEOC Decision No. 79-33, discussed at note 144 infra, wherein the
Commission stated:
Contrary to Respondent's assertion that Charging Party can work for someone
else, a violation of Title VII does not require the discriminatory denial of all
employment opportunities, but only the discriminatory denial of an employ-
ment opportunity. It is no defense that Charging Party may seek work with
another employer.
EEOC Decision No. 79-33, slip op. at 2 (Jan. 16, 1979).
66. 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
67. See note 29 supra.
68. The most recent available evidence in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1978) indicates that women and minorities have hardly begun to achieve propor-
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zation of human potential. ' 69 A narrow interpretation could also en-
courage discrimination in some cases by inducing employers to use
independent contractors rather than employees in some areas of their op-
erations as a means of avoiding the impact of title VII.70
B. Employees of Franchisees and Employees Claiming Discrimination by
Third Parties
The case for extending title VII protection to employees of franchisees 7'
and employees claiming discrimination by third parties in furnishing em-
ployment benefits72 seems clearer. The Sibley and Puntolillo rationales
plainly support their inclusion because in such cases defendants would be
exercising significant control over the plaintiffs' "access to employment op-
portunities."'73 Additionally, Smith and Mathis do not prevent the exten-
sion of title VII to such plaintiffs, for although both cases insist on the
presence of an "employment" relationship in the traditional sense, they do
not necessarily require that relationship to exist between the plaintiff and
defendant. 74
C. Licensees
The language of Smith or Mathis does not expressly bar the extension of
.title VII protection to licensing cases wherein applicants for licenses allege
that they have been discriminatorily denied certification.75 Licensing
boards that deny an applicant a license are plainly controlling the appli-
cant's access to employment in the traditional sense of the term. More-
tional representation in some important areas of economic life. While blacks constituted
11.1% of the total population in 1970 (Id Table No. 35, at 33), the percentage of business
firms owned by blacks in 1972 constituted only 2.2% (Id, derived from Table No. 921, at
564). Females copstituted 51.3% of the total population in 1970 (Id, derived from Table
No. 28, at 28), but owned only 4.6% of business firms in 1972 (Id Table No. 920, at 563).
69. See Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 1196.
70. The foregoing arguments are equally applicable to cases of franchisor discrimina-
tion against franchisees. See note 11 supra. These individuals are likely to be even more
economically dependent upon their franchisors than many independent contractors are on
their employers. Franchisees are arguably also "individuals" within the meaning of
§ 703(a)(1) (see text accompanying notes 45-47 supra) who, if discriminated against in viola-
tion of that section, would be "aggrieved persons" with standing to sue under § 706(b) (see
text accompanying notes 48-52 supra).
71. See note 12 supra.
72. See note 13 supra. Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Or. 1975), and
Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 387 F. Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975), afd, 553 F.2d 58 (9th
Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 702, modfed, 577 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1978), both
held that title VII prohibits discriminatory furnishing of retirement benefits generally. See
also EEOC Decision No. 79-09 (Oct. 20, 1978), discussed at text accompanying notes 130-41
infra.
73. See notes 47 & 56 supra.
74. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the distinctions drawn
by the Smith and Mathis courts between the facts in Sibley and Puntolillo and the facts
before them).
75. One would have to assume, however, that, despite the fact that the manner in which
these courts distinguished Sibley and Puntoliio would not bar the Act's applicability in li-
censing cases, the fact that these courts were unwilling to extend title VII to the cases before
them indicates a similar unwillingness to do so in licensing cases.
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over, the holding in Puntolillo clearly supports the application of title VII
to nonprofessional licensing cases, for the Puntolillo court's concern lay not
so much with the nature of the complainant's occupation as with the power
of a licensing board to determine, on the impermissible basis of national
origin, whether an applicant would be able to earn a living.76
The EEOC has taken the position that title VII does afford protection to
applicants for licensing, both nonprofessional 77 and professional.78 In
Ciancio v. Family Life Insurance Co.79 the Commission held that a state
insurance licensing agency had violated title VII by requiring a prospective
insurance agent to pass an exam given only in English.80 The agency chal-
lenged the Commission's jurisdiction on the basis that the agency had
never been the plaintiffs employer or prospective employer.8 The Com-
mission held that this argument misconceived the letter and spirit of title
VII.82 Title VII, the Commission said, "speaks not of 'employees' but of
'person[s] aggrieved,' "83 and the language of the title and its legislative
history indicate a congressional intent to include more than the conven-
tional employer-employee relationship as evidenced by the specific prohi-
bition against discrimination by employment agencies and referral labor
organizations.84 The Commission further noted that "courts have held
that no employer-employee relationship need exist, only control over ac-
cess to the job market and denial of such access by reference to invidious
criteria. '85 The Commission concluded that the agency was a "person"
within the meaning of the title and that it had blocked the plaintiffs access
to employment by refusing to license him. "The Act requires no more. '86
In EEOC v. Supreme Court87 the Commission unsuccessfully sought en-
forcement of administrative subpoenas against the Supreme Court of New
Mexico, the Board of Bar Examiners, and the New Mexico Board of Bar
Commissioners. The charging parties in the case were three unsuccessful
candidates for admission to the New Mexico bar. The Commission, rely-
ing upon Sibley and Puntolillo, sought to overcome the respondents' chal-
lenge to its jurisdiction by arguing that the state supreme court was an
employer under title VII and that title VII does not require a traditional
76. See note 56 supra. See also Gill v. Monroe County Dep't of Social Servs., 79
F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed at note Ill infra.
77. See Ciancio v. Family Life Ins. Co., Decision No. 75-249, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE
(CCH) 6457 (May 6, 1975).
78. See, e.g., EEOC v. Supreme Court, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8536 (D.N.M. July
21, 1977).
79. Decision No. 75-249, 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 6457 (May 6, 1975).
80. The evidence indicated that Spanish surnamed American examinees had a signifi-
cantly lower pass rate on the challenged examination than non-Spanish surnamed American




84. Id (citing Puntolillo, 325 F. Supp. at 1091).
85. Id (citing Puntolillo, 325 F. Supp. at 1092, and Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1342).
86. Id The Commission again cited Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1342.
87. 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8536 (D.N.M. July 21, 1977).
1980]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
employer-employee relationship.88 This argument was rejected, however,
as it has been in every judicially decided title VII licensing case since
Puntolillo.89
The strongest judicial arguments against applying title VII to alleged
discrimination in licensing occur in cases involving professional licensing.
Woodard v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners90 is representative of those
cases denying title VII jurisdiction in this context. The plaintiff in Wood-
ard, a black male who failed to pass the Virginia bar examination, filed
suit against the State Board of Bar Examiners under various civil rights
statutes,91 alleging that the Board was guilty of various racially discrimina-
tory practices that operated to deprive black applicants of an equal oppor-
tunity to become practicing attorneys in Virginia. 92 The court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss the title VII portion of Woodard's claim,
holding that "Title VII does not apply to the bar examination by its own
terms."
93
Woodard had argued that the Board's control over his access to the at-
torney job market was sufficient to bring his claim within the scope of title
VII. 94 The court, citing Sibley, Puntolillo, and Ciancio, conceded that both
judicial and administrative support existed to bolster this position. 95 The
court also agreed with Woodard's characterization of the degree of control
the Board exercised over his access to employment, stating: "Were the
Sibley rationale otherwise applicable, there is little doubt but that the de-
fendants exercise complete control over the plaintiffs' access to the attor-
ney job market within the Commonwealth of Virginia. ' 96 The court
noted, however, that several other courts had found title VII to be inappli-
cable to challenges to bar examinations 97 and had characterized title VII
88. Id at 6768.
89. See Murry v. Supreme Court, No. 72-2101 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1973); Lavender-
Cabellero v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Woodard
v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va. 1976), af'd, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th
Cir. 1979).
90. 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979).
91. Woodard brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988 in addition to
title VII.
92. 420 F. Supp. at 212.
93. Id The court cited Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 1976),
aft'd on rehearing, 563 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1977). Richardson was, however, a due process
and equal protection suit by four blacks who had failed the South Carolina bar exam. The
plaintiffs apparently made no attempt to argue that title VII directly applied to their case.
The court stated: "Appellants agree that Title VII does not apply to the bar exam by its own
terms." 540 F.2d at 747. Instead, the plaintiffs in Richardson argued that title VII standards
for judging job relatedness, rather than traditional fourteenth amendment tests, should be
applied to the exam. The court disagreed, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
wherein the United States Supreme Court held that where no discriminatory purpose on the
part of the state is proved, application of the more rigorous title VII criteria is unwarranted.
540 F.2d at 747.
94. 420 F. Supp. at 212.
95. Id
96. Id at 213.
97. The court cited Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 940 (1976); Murry v. Supreme Court, No. 72-2101 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1973); and Lewis
v. Hartsock, No. 73-16 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 1976). Tyler was a due process and equal protec-
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test validation guidelines as inappropriate in the bar examination context
because they had been developed in the context of traditional employment
practices.98
The heart of Woodard, however, lies in the distinctions the court drew
between the interests of an employer and those of the state as a licensing
body:
The employer, whether public or private, has the limited interest in
insuring that the individual hired is capable of performing the re-
quired tasks. Whatever the magnitude of this interest, [citations omit-
ted], it falls short of that involved in professional licensing. The
Supreme Court has recognized "that the States have a compelling in-
terest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that
as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other
valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licens-
ing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions." 99
This traditional federal solicitude for the states' strong interest in regulat-
ing the professions was also the primary basis for the court's decision in
EEOC v. Supreme Court, 100 wherein the court characterized the act of ad-
mitting an applicant to the bar as "an exercise of judicial power"' 01 and
tion suit by blacks who failed the Georgia bar exam. The plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully
that the title VII test validation criteria should be applied to the exam. In a dictum the court
stated: "Title VII does not apply by its terms, of course, because the Georgia Board of Bar
Examiners is neither an 'employer,' an 'employment agency,' nor a 'labor organization'
within the meaning of the statute." 517 F.2d at 1096. In Murry the appellants' title VII
claims of racial discrimination in the administration and grading of the Arizona bar exam
were dismissed as "frivolous" without further comment by the court. In Lewis a title VII
suit was dismissed on the grounds that a board of bar examiners did not employ the jurisdic-
tionally required 15 employees (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976)). The Woodard court rejected
this position, concluding that the board was "an agent of the state which unquestionably
employs the requisite number of persons." 420 F. Supp. at 213 n.3.
98. 420 F. Supp. at 214. The court continued:
The employment tests utilized in an industrial setting are designed to measure
an individual's ability to perform certain limited functions or operate particu-
lar machinery. The bar examination, however, serves a much broader pur-
pose. A licensed attorney is presumed competent to handle any of a number
of substantively divergent legal problems which may face his or her clients.
Successful passage of the bar examination is intended to reflect a mastery of a
wide range of substantive knowledge with which to approach such problems.
Id
99. Id (emphasis in original) (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792
(1975)).
100. 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) $ 8536 (D.N.M. July 21, 1977); see notes 87-89 supra.
The court stated: "The doctrine of liberal construction of remedial legislation conflicts
sharply with the restrictions to exercise of federal judicial power to consider challenges in
the attorney licensing area outside of Title VII." Id at 6769. The court further observed
that "[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are
essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and, have histori-
cally been 'officers of the courts.'" Id (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 792 (1975)). In Goldfarb, however, the Court struck down bar association minimum fee
schedules as violative of the Sherman Act. The public policy embodied in title VII is argua-
bly at least as important as that embodied in antitrust laws.
101. 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8536, at 6769 (D.N.M. July 21, 1977) (quoting Doe v.
Pringle, 550 F.2d 596, 599 (10th Cir. 1976), wherein the court in turn quoted In re Summers,
325 U.S. 561, 565-66 (1945)). Significantly, however, the Doe court held that federal district
courts have jurisdiction to hear "a constitutional challenge to the state's general rules and
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concluded that "there is little support for a judicial construction of Title
VII which would allow it to expand into an area where federal judicial
power has been traditionally restricted."'' 0 2
Professional licensing applicants, however, have a greater need for the
increased protection afforded by title VII, 10 3 because they have even more
at stake than ordinary applicants for employment. As the plaintiffs in
Tyler v. Vickery pointed out: "The stakes are much higher than in an ordi-
nary employment testing situation because failure results not in the loss of
a specific job opportunity but in denial of the right to practice law in an
entire state."l°4 Moreover, to the extent that the further integration of mi-
nority applicants into the professions is hindered by professional examina-
tions that have a disproportionate impact on minorities, the general
purpose underlying title VII would seem to argue for its application in
such cases.' 05 As the United States Supreme Court admonished in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. :106 "Under the Act [Title VII], practices, procedures, or
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices."' 107 Admittedly valid concerns for the integrity of
federalism do not justify allowing a state to discriminate against an appli-
cant for professional licensing in a manner in which the state clearly is
prohibited from discriminating against its own employees. 0 8 Despite the
merits of the foregoing arguments, however, one could probably realisti-
regulations governing admission," but that only the United States Supreme Court may hear
a claim seeking "review of a state court's adjudication of a particular application." 550 F.2d
at 597. Allegations by title VII plaintiffs that a state discriminates against applicants for
admission to the bar on the basis of race or sex would seem to be more analogous to the first
kind of challenge than to the second.
102. 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 6770.
103. Title VII standards for testing job-relatedness require that the challenged test be
"shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be 'predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs
for which candidates are being evaluated.'" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
431 (1975). The title VII validation process "involves a more probing judicial review of, and
less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is
appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory pur-
pose, is claimed." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976). The applicable constitu-
tional standard also involves a "job-relatedness" aspect, but there the test is whether the
subject examination "has a rational relationship to" an applicant's fitness to practice the
profession in question. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1103 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 940 (1976). In two cases refusing to apply title VII standards, the courts have
indicated that doing so would have necessitated invalidating the challenged exam. See
Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 746-47 (4th Cir. 1976), affidon rehearing, 563 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976).
104. 517 F.2d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976), discussed at
note 97 supra. See also Judge Adam's dissent in Tyler, wherein he observed that "the exam-
ination here, although not administered by an 'employer' for the purpose of hiring, is for all
practical purposes an employment test. The applicant who fails it may not, in any respect,
be employed to practice law within the state." Id at 1107.
105. See note 53 supra.
106. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
107. Id at 430.
108. See note 61 supra.
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cally assume that the judicial reception afforded to previous attempts to
apply title VII to professional licensing situations is indicative of the fate
awaiting future attempts in this area.
Even if the principles enunciated in Woodard and EEOC v. Supreme
Court are valid in the context of professional licensing, the rationale of
those cases should not be extended to nonprofessional licensing situations.
In such cases there exists neither the compelling state interest previously
noted'0 9 nor the strong body of precedent restricting the extension of fed-
eral power into a highly sensitive area of state action.1 0 Additionally, the
rationale of Puntolillo provides clear judicial support for the application of
title VII to such licensing cases. I I Nonetheless, two recent lower court
decisions have denied title VII jurisdiction in nonprofessional licensing
contexts.
In Lavender-Cabellero v. Department of Consumer Affairs 112 the court
granted the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs' motion to
dismiss a title VII claim alleging that the department had unlawfully dis-
criminated in its licensing of process servers. The court noted that neither
the language of the Act nor its legislative history specifically addressed the
issue of whether protection should be extended to a city agency that has
statutory authority to issue licenses, 1 3 even though the 1972 amendments
to the Act' 14 had "explicitly extended Title VII to state and local govern-
ments who [are] employers within the meaning of the Act."' '15 It charac-
terized the plaintiffs claim as calling for "sweeping court legislation"' 1 6
and concluded that if it could be demonstrated that such action was neces-
sary to prevent discrimination, such demonstration "should properly be
made in the halls of Congress, not the courtroom." 117
The Lavender-Cabellero court distinguished Sibley because the defend-
ant hospital in Sibley was not a state or city licensing agency performing a
separate public, as opposed to private, function apart from employment
109. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
110. See notes 10 1-02 supra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 56 & 61 supra. See also Gill v. Monroe County Dep't of Social Servs., 79
F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), a suit alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, race, and
national origin by a county social services department and a state civil service commission
and state social services department. The county defendants argued that the state defend-
ants had exclusive control over employment decisions involving allegedly discriminatory
civil service exams and job qualifications. The state defendants moved to dismiss on the
grounds that they were neither "employers" nor "employment agencies" within the meaning
of title VII. The court, citing Sibley and Puniolillo, disagreed, stating:
If in fact the county defendants are acting solely as agents of the state defend-
ants, then the state defendants are employers within the meaning of Title VII.
Even if the state defendants do not directly employ the plaintiffs, they are
within the reach of Title VII if they control access to the plaintiffs' job market.
Id at 334.
112. 458 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
113. See note 17 supra.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1970)).
115. 458 F. Supp. at 214.
116. Id at 215.
117. Id
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itself.I 18 The court also distinguished Puntolillo on the highly dubious
grounds that the plaintiff-defendant relationship was primarily one of em-
ployment. The court emphasized that the defendant racing commission, in
addition to granting licenses for harness horse racing, also operated a race-
way and had jurisdiction over all facets of harness racing. 19 Puntolillo
was thus characterized as a case involving a state agency performing essen-
tially private functions, 120 while the licensing of process servers was lik-
ened to "the regulatory function delineated by the line of cases holding
that governmental bodies are not employers within the meaning of Title
VII when exercising their licensing function with respect to bar examina-
tions."' 2' Admitting that a process server's license was not a professional
license, the court nonetheless concluded that the city had a compelling
interest in the service of process within its jurisdiction. 122
In NOW v. Waterfront Commission123 the court granted a motion to dis-
miss a sex discrimination suit by the National Organization for Women
against the defendant Waterfront Commission 124 on the grounds that the
Commission was neither an "employer" nor an "employment agency"
within the meaning of title VII. 125 The court rested its decision on the lack
of legislative history indicating "that Congress, in removing the exemption
for state government 'employers', intended to benefit anyone other than
those actually employed or seeking to be employed by state governments
or their subdivisions."' 126 The court characterized Puntolillo and Gill v.
Monroe County Department of Social Services127 as resting upon a misap-
plication of Sibley, 28 which it distinguished as unrelated to state police
power.' 29 Thus the judicial fate awaiting future attempts to extend title
118. Id
119. Id Clearly, however, any "employment" relationship existing in Puntolillo was be-
tween the plaintiff driver-trainer and individual racehorse owners. See note 56 supra. The
relationship between driver-trainers and horse owners could, in fact, have been an in-
dependent contractor relationship. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
120. 458 F. Supp. at 215.
121. Id (citing Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va.
1976), af'd, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979), and Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976)).
122. Id The court alluded to problems with "sewer service" of process to justify this
compelling interest on the city's part. Because minorities are generally conceived as the
primary victims of "sewer service" (in part because of the alleged unwillingness of process
servers to enter some parts of the community), one would think that the public interest
would better be served by a large number of minority process servers.
123. 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9253 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1979).
124. The plaintiffs alleged that the Commission had accepted applications for cargo
checker jobs only from the ranks of registered longshoremen, a predominantly male group.
125. The court explained: "In its licensing role, the Commission neither pays the wages
nor engages the services of persons it registers. Nor does it undertake to obtain workers for
employers or jobs for workers. It is, therefore, neither an 'employer' nor an 'employment
agency' with respect to persons desiring registration." 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 7506.
126. Id "We cannot believe that a Congress that had before it such a meticulous
enumeration of the categories of entities covered by the Act would have left to speculation
and conjecture any desire to subject to federal regulation city and state licensing activities of
which it was obviously aware." Id at 7507.
127. 79 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); see note Ill supra.




VII protection to applications for nonprofessional licenses is, at best, un-
certain.
II. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION'S
JURISDICTIONAL TEST
Despite the fact that attempts to broaden title VII jurisdiction have met
with mixed success in the courts, the EEOC has adopted a broad jurisdic-
tional test based, in part, on Sibley and Puntolillo. In a 1978 decision the
EEOC delineated its jurisdictional test. 130 The action involved twelve fe-
male employees who charged that their employer had discriminated
against them by offering an optional retirement program through an in-
surer that paid lower monthly pension benefits to females than to males on
the basis of sex-segregated actuarial tables projecting a longer life expec-
tancy for females. Further, the complainants charged that the employer
failed to inform its female employees of the unequal benefit feature at the
time when they were required to make an irrevocable decision concerning
enrollment in the pension plan. The complainants also charged that the
insurer had violated title VII by discriminating against women in its une-
qual distribution of pension benefits. 131
The respondent insurer argued that its actions were not within the pur-
view of title VII because it did not employ the complainants, and therefore
the EEOC had no jurisdiction over it in its capacity as an insurer providing
and distributing retirement benefits through contracts with the employees.
The Commission rejected this contention, noting the statutory language
supporting a broad view of the Act's reach, 132 and concluded that "the fact
that the women claiming to be aggrieved were not Respondent-Insurer's
employees does not bar the Commission's jurisdiction over the charge
against [Respondent-Insurer]. The operative factor is Respondent-In-
surer's ability to deny them an employment benefit."' 133
The Commission then listed four criteria for jurisdiction, claiming au-
thority over a charge against a respondent:
1. when the respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec-
tion 701(b);
130. EEOC Decision No. 79-09 (Oct. 20, 1978) has not been generally reported. Current
EEOC policy forbids disclosure of the names of the parties involved in such cases.
13 1. Id slip op. at I.
132. The Commission found:
That the use of the term "employer" in Sec. 703(a) does not establish a rela-
tionship to which the proscriptions of that section apply is indicated by the
wording of Sec. 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2). Section 703(a)(1), in contrast to Sec-
tion 703(a)(2), does not limit its prohibitions to discrimination against "em-
ployees" or "applicants for employment", but prohibits discrimination against
any indipidual on the basis of any of the enumerated criteria.
Id at 3 (emphasis in original); see note 19 supra for the relevant statutory language.
133. EEOC Decision No. 79-09, slip op. at 3. The Commission further observed that its
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a charge "focuses on whether the Respondent acted in
a manner or made a decision which allegedly deprived the Charging Party of a right pro-
tected by Section 703 or Section 704 of the Act." Id
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2. when the respondent is responsible for the act or decision com-
plained of;
3. when the act or decision adversely affects the charging party; and
4. when that adverse effect is alleged to be a deprivation of a right
protected by Section 703 or Section 704 of the Act. 134
The Commission then observed, in response to the first requirement, that
there was no dispute that the insurer was an employer within the meaning
of section 701(b). 135 The second part of the jurisdictional test, the Com-
mission concluded, was satisfied by the fact that the insurer had irrevoca-
ble control over the money contributed to the fund. 136 The third part of
the test was deemed met because the complainants' monthly payments
upon retirement would be less than those of similarly situated males.' 37
Finally, the Commission observed that title VII protects pension rights' 38
and that the complainants had alleged the insurer's actions to be a depriva-
tion of rights protected by section 703 of the Act. 139 The Commission then
noted the existence of precedent for the proposition that the use of such
sex-segregated tables to determine employment benefits violates title
VI1 40 and, after analyzing the discriminatory effect of the insurer's policy,
concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that it had vio-
lated the Act.' 41
One noteworthy aspect of the Commission's four-step jurisdictional test
is that it focuses upon the alleged discriminatory act, rather than upon the
particular relationship between the parties. 142 To be sure, step one re-
134. Id
135. ld
136. Id In this connection the Commission subsequently observed:
The member institutions of Respondent-Insurer cannot withdraw the funds
once they are placed with Respondent-Insurer, nor can they tell Respondent-
Insurer how these funds are to be distributed. Neither the employer nor the
employees have any control over those resources; those funds already contrib-
uted to the [Respondent-Insurer] may not be withdrawn. The act of distribut-
ing the funds in the manner in which they are distributed is solely within the
discretion of Respondent-Insurer.
Id. at 4.
137. Id at 5.
138. Id at 4 (citing Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973)).
139. EEOC Dec. No. 79-09, slip op. at 5. For the applicable statutory language, see note
19 supra.
140. EEOC Dec. No. 79-09, slip op. at 5 (citing City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), which held that requiring female employees to make
larger pension contributions than their male counterparts violated § 703(a)(1) of title VII).
141. EEOC Dec. No. 79-09, slip op. at 8.
142. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 79-32 (Jan. 16, 1979), wherein the charging party
alleged that the respondent failed to hire her as a sales representative because of her sex.
The respondent argued that title VII did not apply to its actions because the position the
charging party sought was that of an independent contractor, not that of an employee. After
examining the degree of control the respondent exercised over its sales representatives, the
Commission stated:
While the Respondent has control over the method and manner in which the
work is accomplished and should be considered a common law employer, we
consider it more appropriate to determine the Commission's jurisdiction over
the charge by the character of the Respondent's act which is alleged to have
denied the Charging Party an employment opportunity.
Id slip op. at 4.
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quires that the respondent be an "employer" as defined in section 701(b) of
the Act before personal jurisdiction attaches. 143 This requirement, how-
ever, is treated solely as defining a class subject to the Act rather than as a
prerequisite form of relationship between a charging party and a respon-
dent. 144 By focusing on the discriminatory act involved, the Commission
has manifested a firm commitment to the expanded scope of title VII sanc-
tioned by Sibley and Puntolillo.
An aspect of step one likely to raise questions of application relates to
the statute's requirement that "employers" have fifteen employees. Some
entities that would otherwise be subject to the Act will clearly be excluded
on this basis. A related question concerns when a respondent lacking the
required number of employees may be treated as an "agent" of another
entity that does meet the statutory criterion, and thus be subject to the Act
on that basis.' 45 An example is a state licensing board employing fewer
than the required number of employees. The weight of authority indicates
that the board may be treated as the agent of the state, and thus be subject
to personal jurisdiction under step one. 146
A related theory that, for jurisdictional purposes, may facilitate the ag-
gregation of the employees of two or more nominally separate entities is
the "integrated enterprise" theory. This concept is derived from National
Labor Relations Board jurisdiction cases. 147 The factors that are generally
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976), quoted in note 19 supra.
144. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 79-33 (Jan. 16, 1979), wherein the charging party
alleged that the respondent had denied him permission to sell insurance on its behalf be-
cause of his national origin. The respondent argued that title VII did not apply because the
charging party was an independent contractor. The Commission disagreed, stating: "The
use of the word 'employer' in Sec. 703(a) does not establish a relationship to which those
unlawful employment practices are limited, rather it only declares a class of persons (those
who employ fifteen or more employees) to which the prohibitions apply." Id at 2.
145. Section 70 1(b) includes within its "employer" definition "any agent of such a per-
son." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
146. In Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211, 213 n.3 (E.D. Va.
1976), the court concluded that the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners was "an agent of the
state which unquestionably employs the requisite number of persons." See also EEOC v.
Supreme Court, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8536, at 6768 (D.N.M. July 21, 1977), wherein
the court stated: "The Supreme Court of New Mexico is a person and an employer within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The Board of Bar Examiners is an agent of the Supreme
Court and is, therefore, considered to be an employer to the extent that the Supreme Court is
an employer." But see Lewis v. Hartsock, No. 73-16 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 1976).
The possibility also exists that under an agency theory board members may be held per-
sonally liable in their individual capacities for discriminatory board actions. See Hanshaw
v. Delaware Technical & Community College, 405 F. Supp. 292 (D. Del. 1975), a race and
sex discrimination suit against a college, its board of trustees in their individual and official
capacities, and its president and two "campus directors" in their individual and official ca-
pacities. Therein the court observed that "it is not necessary for the members of the Board
to be a 'person having fifteen or more employees,' if the Board members can be considered
agents of an institution which is such a person." Id at 295. Without holding that the board
members were agents, the court denied their motion for summary judgment, noting: "As a
matter of law, the Board members may be inferred to be agents." Id at 296. See also
Padilla v. Stringer, 395 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.M. 1974).
147. See, e.g., Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1964), involving a
California licensee of an Ohio corporation (Sakrete, Inc.) that unsuccessfully argued that it
was not subject to NLRB jurisdiction because its activities were wholly intrastate in nature.
The court, noting that the same persons owned the stock of both corporations and were also
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considered relevant in determining whether application of this theory is
appropriate are: an interrelation of the operations of the companies; cen-
tralized control of labor relations; common management of the related en-
tities; and common ownership or financial control. 148 The EEOC has
adopted the integrated enterprise theory, 149 and it has enjoyed judicial ap-
plication in some title VII cases.150 The most important factors supporting
the existence of an integrated enterprise appear to be those indicating a
high degree of operational integration. Common ownership standing
alone clearly is insufficient.151
A more troublesome question that may arise about step one's applica-
tion concerns who appropriately may be considered an employee for the
purpose of calculating the jurisdictionally required number of employees.
A situation with factual circumstances similar to those of the overlying
carrier in Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co. 152 serves as an example. The over-
lying carrier could have fewer than fifteen employees in the common law
sense of the term, but regularly enter subhauling contracts with several
subhaulers like Smith. The issue would be whether the Commission could
include all aggrieved persons similarly situated to a charging party in a
respondent's employee total, although such aggrieved persons are not em-
ployees in the common law sense. 153 While this situation has yet to arise,
the Commission would likely include all such aggrieved persons, because
that approach would be consistent with its broad view of title VII jurisdic-
tion. 154
More difficult problems of application can arise, however, when one at-
officers and directors of both, concluded: "[Tihe facts show that the operations of petitioner
and Sakrete are closely integrated, that their labor relations policies are almost identical and
are centrally controlled, that the management of both resides virtually in one man, and that
both are commonly owned and financially controlled." Id at 906. Thus the court upheld
the NLRB's finding that the two corporations could be considered as "a single employer" for
jurisdictional purposes.
148. Id at 905 n.4.
149. See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 71-1537, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6235 (Mar. 3,
1971).
150. See, e.g., Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613,616 (E.D. La.
1972), wherein the court treated an association of steamship companies, 12 of which lacked
the required number of employees, as a single employer for title VII purposes due to the fact
that the association controlled employment on the waterfront, established policies and prac-
tices applicable to all member companies, and operated a central hiring hall.
151. See, e.g., Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tenn. 1971),
wherein an employee of a wholly owned subsidiary that lacked the requisite number of
employees argued that the parent corporation should be considered his employer for title
VII purposes. The court disagreed, observing that "[t]he control exercised by the parent by
virtue of its stock holding is exercised in the usual way by the election of the subsidiary's
board and officers. The affairs of the two are generally handled separately." Id. at 433.
152. 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), afrd, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978); see notes 21-
30 supra and accompanying text.
153. This problem could arise in different factual contexts, such as a real estate broker
employing sales agents who may not meet all the traditional common law employee criteria,
or a very small manufacturing firm using sales representatives. See also notes 142 & 144
supra.
154. This approach would also discourage employers from fragmenting control over em-
ployees in an attempt to avoid title VII jurisdiction. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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tempts to apply step two of the Commission's jurisdictional test to deter-
mine who bears responsibility for the alleged discriminatory act. The
application of step two is fairly straightforward when the respondent is the
charging party's employer in the common law sense and the act com-
plained of, such as a refusal to hire or a discharge, is solely that of the
respondent. Even in independent contractor and licensing cases, the act of
the respondent clearly deprives the charging party of an employment op-
portunity. 55 In some situations, however, more than one respondent may
be responsible for an alleged discriminatory act. Two or more respondents
may act in concert to deprive a charging party of a protected right. The
agency and integrated enterprise theories discussed previously 56 as meth-
ods for aggregating the employees of related entities for jurisdictional pur-
poses may also be applied for purposes of affixing responsibility for
discriminatory acts. Thus in Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co. 157 McLean
was held responsible for the discriminatory behavior of Modem Automo-
tive Services, Inc. (MAS), a wholly owned subsidiary. The court examined
the degree of control McLean exerted over MAS's operations, 58 and con-
cluded that "McLean and MAS are operated in many respects, as a single
unit." 159 Similarly, in United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Association of
Steam, 60 a race discrimination suit against a steamfitter's union and a
trade association that engaged in collective bargaining on behalf of its
members, the trade association was held to be a proper party to the suit
because "as a trade association for purposes of unified collective bargain-
ing, [the association] performs the functions of an agent for its member
contractors." 161
More complex problems of affixing liability arise in instances where a
charging party's employer has delegated some aspect of the employment
function to a third party, such as an insurer providing health or pension
benefits or a testing firm screening applicants for employment or testing
155. See note 56 supra and text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
156. See notes 145-51 supra and accompanying text.
157. 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975).
158. The court observed: "They have common officers and directors; MAS services Mc-
Lean vehicles principally; McLean keeps personnel records for both companies; and Mc-
Lean screens and tests applicants for employment for both companies at a single office
staffed with McLean's employees." Id at 229-30.
159. Id at 229.
160. 360 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), modified, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
161. 360 F. Supp. at 995. The court also observed that they enjoyed equal representation
with the union in the operation of the challenged apprenticeship program and concluded
that "MCA has greater influence over and responsibility for employment practices applying
to the industry as a whole than any single employer." Id See also Woodford v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911, 916 (N.D. Ga. 1973), a suit alleging violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, wherein the court acknowledged that a parent corpora-
tion could be liable for the discriminatory employment practices of its subsidiary if "the
parent corporation so controls the subsidiary that the subsidiary is merely the agent or in-
strumentality of the parent." For examples of cases in which no agency relationship was
found, see Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975), and Butler v. Local
4, Laborers' Int'l Union, 308 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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employees seeking certain job classifications. 162 If the delegate discrimina-
torily distributes the benefits in question or administers an invalid test, the
employer remains liable for its selection of a delegate that acts in a dis-
criminatory manner and for delegating the employment function to such a
delegate.' 63 The more difficult problem is to determine under what cir-
cumstances the delegate is also liable. This issue may appropriately be
resolved by an inquiry into the degree of control the delegate exercises
over the subject employment function. If the employer delegates the sub-
ject function and allows the delegate to determine the method of achieving
the desired result, the delegate who chooses a discriminatory method will
be liable if its decision is controlling, as in the case of an insurer discrimi-
natorily distributing pension benefits. Likewise, the delegate will be liable
if the employer relies on the delegate's determination when considering
employees, as in the case of the employer who makes hiring or promotion
decisions solely on the basis of discriminatory test results. In the latter
instance, if the employer did not rely on the invalid test results but instead
made an independent judgment, the delegate would not be liable. 164 Some
cases will generate close factual questions concerning the impact of the
delegate's actions on the charging party. The employer may consider all
applicants regardless of test results or may consider such results as only
one factor in its decision making. In view of the extant authority for the
proposition that decisions that are even partially based on discriminatory
criteria are illegal, 165 however, step two of the test should be satisfied un-
less the facts indicate that the employer made the decision without any
consideration of the invalid test results. If, on the other hand, the em-
ployer dictates the delegate's discriminatory methods, a delegate perform-
ing such a ministerial function under the employer's control should not be
162. For example, an employer might require that all employees seeking supervisory po-
sitions be tested.
163. In EEOC Decision No. 79-09 (Oct. 20, 1978), discussed at text accompanying notes
130-41 supra, the EEOC held that the respondent-employer as well as the respondent-in-
surer had violated title VII.
164. This situation, however, is likely to be rare, because one might reasonably infer
some degree of employer reliance from the fact that the employer pays for the delegate's
services.
165. See, e.g., King v. Laborers Int'l Union Local 818, 443 F.2d 273, 278-79 (6th Cir.
1971), wherein the court stated:
Thus, if one is unlawfully discriminated against in violation of Title VII, an
employer need not reinstate him or grant back pay if it can be shown that the
employer also had a lawful non-discriminatory motivation for his actions
which when considered by itself would have caused the same result as his
discriminatory purpose. But where it can be shown that discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin was, in part, a causal factor
in a discharge or refusal to hire the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is
statutorily entitled to damages of lost compensation.
See also EEOC Decision No. 74-93, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 6426 (Mar. 7, 1974).
Compare Rogers v. EEOC, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,549 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 1977)
and Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs in both cases seeking back
pay awards for denial of promotions for allegedly discriminatory reasons could not recover
because evidence indicated they would. not have been promoted in the absence of discrimi-
nation) with Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973) (employer who used
sex as a factor in job qualification was guilty of discrimination).
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responsible for the discriminatory act. 166 The same result may occur in
cases where the employer's delegate does not have irrevocable control over
employment-generated resources. 167 For example, an insurer that pro-
vides health insurance benefits ordinarily only provides current coverage
based on periodic payments, and the employer has the right to prospec-
tively alter the coverage or benefit level. In such a case, the insurer should
not be liable for discrimination in benefit provisions.
In contrast to the problems that could arise in the application of step
two, step three of the Commission's test requiring an adverse effect should
be fairly simple to apply in most cases. Once a court establishes that a
respondent is an employer for purposes of the Act and is responsible for
the act or decision complained of under step two, the presence or absence
of an adverse effect upon the charging party should be readily ascertain-
able. In situations involving traditional employment relationships, the ad-
verse effect will most often be rather obvious: the plaintiff will have been
denied employment or promotion, discharged, or given an unjustifiably
reduced level of employment benefits. In licensing cases the adverse im-
pact will be equally apparent. 168 In independent contractor cases the
Commission has taken the position that whenever a complainant has been
discriminatorily deprived of an employment opportunity, a basis for title
VII jurisdiction exists. 169
According to step four, the Commission must determine that the adverse
effect determined in step three involves a deprivation of a protected right
resulting from a practice proscribed by title VII. Numerous nondiscrimi-
natory acts by an employer may adversely affect an employee's employ-
ment rights without violating title VII.' 70 The major area of disagreement
166. The case of a doctor who routinely examines all of an employer's job applicants and
is directed to measure their height, weight, blood pressure, and pulse rate and report such
data to the employer is such an example. If the employer uses the data thus obtained to
implement unjustifiable height and weight standards for various job classifications (which
standards may ultimately have the effect of discriminating against females and a dispropor-
tionate number of males of certain racial origins), the doctor in question will not be in
violation of title VII. More common examples would include employers who direct insurers
to pay employment benefits on a discriminatory basis, or direct screening firms to use invalid
testing devices. For an interesting reversal of this factual situation in which the common law
employer of plaintiffs alleging discrimination in testing and job qualifications maintains that
the use of such devices is mandated by two state agencies, see Gill v. Monroe County Dep't
of Social Servs., 79 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed at note Ill supra.
167. EEOC decisions imposing liability on insurers emphasize the fact that the respon-
dent-insurer had irrevocable control over the subject resources. See, e.g., EEOC Decision
No. 79-09 (Oct. 20, 1978), discussed at note 136 supra and accompanying text. See also
EEOC Decision No. 74-118, 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) $ 6431, at 4152 (Apr. 26, 1974),
holding that a municipal agency paying lower monthly pension benefits to female municipal
employees "has such a direct involvement in, and control over, the retirement system to
which Respondent City belongs and which affects Charging Party, that it falls within the
proscriptions of section 703(a)(1) of the Act notwithstanding that [it] is not Charging Party's
employer."
168. See text acompanying notes 103-04 supra.
169. See note 65 supra. But see Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978).
170. An employee may have been denied promotion as a result of failing an examination
required by the employer of all candidates for promotion, but the test may not have ad-
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concerning the application of step four is certain to be the scope of the
rights included in the title's protection of "employment opportunites' 17'
and the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."'' 72 Standing re-
quirements dictate that complainants show their interests to be "within the
zone of interests" protected by the statute. 73 As discussed earlier, the
Commission has expressly adopted an expanded view of the scope of title
VII based on Sibley's and Puntolillo's focus upon a defendant's ability to
deny the complainant an "employment opportunity" rather than the exist-
ence of a common law employer-employee relationship. 174 The Commis-
sion has taken the position that title VII protects the rights of applicants
before state licensing bodies, both professional 75 and nonprofessional, 76
and it will likely continue to assert jurisdiction in such cases unless it is
barred from so doing by an ultimate judicial resolution of the issue to the
contrary.
The Commission also appears to be firmly committed to the idea that
title VII protects the rights of independent contractors as well as common
law employees.' 77 This position has produced a judicial statement of con-
cern that under the Commission's broad view of the title's scope "all con-
tractual relationships between businessmen would logically be subject to
the Act's coverage.'178 The Commission, in an amicus curiae memoran-
dum submitted to the Mathis179 court, stated its contrary view that "the
protections afforded by Title VII against racial discrimination accrue
[only] to an individual who provides an employer, on a continuing basis,
with services or labor which are regularly necessary for the employer to
carry on its business."' 180 The Commission noted that Mathis's industrial
waste removal services were "an integral and on-going essential part of the
operation of the defendant employer's business. If this work were not per-
formed by a nonemployee who contracted to perform it, it would of neces-
sity have to be performed by defendant's own employees."' 8' The
Commission concluded by expressing the concern that failure to extend
the title's protection to Mathis and others similarly situated would en-
courage employers to avoid the title by increasing the percentage of their
versely affected the employee's class, or it may have been valid under title VII testing crite-
ria.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976), quoted in note 19 supra.
172. See id § 2000e-2(a)(1), quoted in note 19 supra.
173. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 48-52 supra and accompa-
nying text and note 58 supra.
174. See note 65 supra and text accompanying notes 130-34 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 79-86 supra.
177. See notes 142 & 144 supra.
178. Mathis v. Standard Brands Chem. Indus., Inc., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,306,
at 5247 n.1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 1975).
179. See note 58 supra.
180. Memorandum of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at
6, Mathis v. Standard Brands Chem. Indus., Inc., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,306 (N.D.




operations performed by independent contractors.182
Although the Mathis court rejected the "continuing basis" distinction, 8 3
the test embodies concepts espoused by employment cases predating the
advent of title VII.1 84 The most interesting aspect of the "continuous ba-
sis" idea is its focus upon the operations of the defendant employer rather
than upon the economic situation of the complainant. Employers utilizing
independent contractors on a one-time or irregular basis are apparently
immune from the title's scrutiny although the complainant may be eco-
nomically dependent upon gaining temporary employment from several
employers operating in such a manner.' 85 The frequency of the use of
independent contractors required to satisfy the "continuing basis" test is as
yet undetermined.
By adopting and applying the "deprivation of protected rights" jurisdic-
tional test, the Commission has decided that the public policy considera-
tions underlying title VII 86 and its own role in furthering the
advancement of those policies dictate a broad interpretation of the juris-
dictional scope of the title. The Commission's view of its jurisdiction finds
support not only in public policy but also in the language of the title.
Those courts that have narrowly construed the title have erroneously fo-
cused on the terms "employer" and "employee" as used in the title, while
ignoring other statutory language extending the title's proscriptions be-
yond the traditional employment context. A broad conception of the title's
jurisdictional scope is an important component in securing the full integra-
tion of disadvantaged groups into American economic life.
182. "If such individuals were not covered by the Title, an employer could, of course,
avoid its proscriptions against discrimination merely by contracting out all the work per-
formed by its employees." Id at n.7.
183. The court characterized the Commission's "continuing basis" test as "an arbitrary
cut-off point." 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,306, at 5247 n.l.
184. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947), discussed at note 29 supra;
Walling v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1947), discussed at note 54
supra.
185. The application of the continuing basis test to Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F.
Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), ajj'd, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978), would plainly include
Smith within the scope of title VII, because Dutra regularly utilized subhaulers like Smith.
See note 22 sutpra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
1980]
The Board of Editors of the Southwestern Law Journal is pleased to


















































































The Honorable Irving L. Goldberg
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Judicial Circuit
Alfred Hill
Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law
Columbia University School of Law
A.A. Sommer, Jr.




United States Court of Appeals






Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver
& Jacobson
New York, New York
The Honorable William A. Goffe
United States Tax Court
Washington, D.C.
The Honorable Joe R. Greenhill
Chief Justice
The Supreme Court of Texas
Bruce Alan Mann
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro
San Francisco, California










The University of Texas
School of Law
